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The seniority of debt, which determines the order in which a bankrupt institution repays its debts,
is an important and sometimes contentious feature of financial crises, yet its impact on system-wide
stability is not well understood. We capture seniority of debt in a multiplex network, a graph of
nodes connected by multiple types of edges. Here, an edge between banks denotes a debt contract
of a certain level of seniority. Next we study cascading default. There exist multiple kinds of
bankruptcy, indexed by the highest level of seniority at which a bank cannot repay all its debts.
Self-interested banks would prefer that all their loans be made at the most senior level. However,
mixing debts of different seniority levels makes the system more stable, in that it shrinks the set of
network densities for which bankruptcies spread widely. We compute the optimal ratio of senior to
junior debts, which we call the optimal seniority ratio, for two uncorrelated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks.
If institutions erode their buffer against insolvency, then this optimal seniority ratio rises; in other
words, if default thresholds fall, then more loans should be senior. We generalize the analytical
results to arbitrarily many levels of seniority and to heavy-tailed degree distributions.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 spurred a flurry
of research on financial contagion using a variety of net-
work models [1–7]. In most of these models, financial
institutions interact in just one way, such as making one
type of loan to one another. In practice, however, banks
interact in many ways, all of which can contribute to
a crisis: banks issue loans of different durations and of
different levels of riskiness; they trade assets with each
other; and they hold assets in common. Models have only
recently begun to capture more than one of these kinds of
interactions [8–10]. Relatively unexplored is the seniority
of debts, which determines the order in which bankrupt
institutions repay their debts. Individual creditors pay
close attention to their assets’ seniority levels, but lit-
tle is known about how the system-wide composition of
seniority levels affects the risk of large crises.
A concurrent and mostly independent thread of litera-
ture in physics has studied multiplex networks, or graphs
with multiple sets of edges (or “network layers”) ; for re-
views, see [11, 12]. Variants of percolation on multiplex
networks have received much attention [13–17]. Closer to
financial default contagion are models of threshold cas-
cade on multiplex networks [18–20]. In these threshold
models, nodes exist in one of two states (e.g., adopted a
behavior or not, gone bankrupt or not), and after a node
adopts the behavior (or goes bankrupt), it influences its
neighbors in all layers to do so as well. A common
conclusion from these models of percolation and thresh-
old cascades on multiplex networks is that the system’s
∗ Corresponding author. kobayashi@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp
vulnerability to large cascades cannot be understood by
examining the vulnerability of any one layer to large cas-
cades [13–20]. In particular, in threshold models, the
interactions among network layers can make large cas-
cades easier (if nodes combine influence from multiple
types of neighbors in a disjunctive [18] or weighted [19]
way) or more difficult (if nodes combine influence in a
conjunctive way [20]).
In this paper, we combine these two strands of research
to study a financial phenomena of interest: how vulner-
ability to cascading default depends on the seniority of
debts. Financial institutions (hereafter called “banks”
for simplicity) hold debt in one another; more generally,
they have exposure to one another’s default risk through
interbank lending and/or security holding. Each debt
contract has a certain level of seniority. When a bank
goes into default (i.e., when a bank’s liabilities exceed
its assets), the bank sells its remaining assets to pay off
whatever liabilities it can in decreasing order of seniority,
from most senior liability to most junior liability.
In our model, there exist multiple types of bankruptcy,
indexed by the highest level of seniority at which a bank
cannot repay all its debts. Using a technique called the
cascade condition [18–25], we study whether a small
number of initial bankruptcies (of certain types) triggers
a cascade of many bankruptcies.
The model has interesting tradeoffs. Self-interested
banks would prefer to lend at the most senior level in
order to maximize the assets they would recover in the
event of its debtors defaulting. However, if all banks
lend at the most senior level, then the system is espe-
cially vulnerable to large cascades of default, in the sense
that cascades are likely large for a large interval of net-
work densities. (This extreme case recovers the models
in [1, 2].)
ar
X
iv
:1
50
1.
05
40
0v
3 
 [q
-fi
n.G
N]
  2
7 M
ay
 20
15
2By contrast, the presence of debts of different seniority
makes the system less vulnerable to bankruptcies spread-
ing widely. For the case of two seniority levels (called
“junior” and “senior”), our main result is to derive the
“optimal” ratio of senior loans to junior loans (for a
simple class of uncorrelated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi multiplex net-
works). Here, “optimal” means that it minimizes the size
of the interval of network densities for which bankrupt-
cies likely spread widely. The optimal multiplex networks
have on the order of 50% to 100% more senior loans than
junior ones. As banks’ leverage (i.e., assets divided by net
worth) increases, this “optimal seniority ratio” increases,
meaning that more loans should be senior rather than
junior in order to minimize the size of the set of network
densities such that cascades are likely large. We also
show that the optimal seniority ratio is qualitatively sim-
ilar for heavy-tailed degree distributions like those found
in real interbank lending networks [26–28]. These results
indicate what types of “seniority–multiplex” interbank
networks are most insusceptible to large cascades of de-
fault.
The most recent scheme for financial regulation, called
Basel III, emphasizes the liability structure of individual
banks, but it does not take into account how seniority
of debts affect systemic risk. Our results suggest that
seniority of debt could be an important focus of financial
regulators and of macro-prudential policies.
Furthermore, this work contributes to the rapidly
growing area of research on contagion in multiplex net-
works by introducing a model in which nodes can “ac-
tivate” in more than one way, which we call “multilevel
contagion”. An interpretation of this model for the
contagious spread of fads, products, etc. in social net-
works [21] is that the kinds of neighbors a person influ-
ences depends on how excited that person is. Thus, the
model resembles the multistage model of complex conta-
gion [25] but on multiplex networks.
A. Related literature
Theoretical studies of contagion in financial networks
generally fall into two classes [29]. Some studies con-
sider a particular instance of a financial network, usually
a complicated and in some cases empirically measured
object. Other studies consider probability distributions
over financial networks.
Our study belongs to the latter class, but two pa-
pers closely related to our analysis belong to the for-
mer [30, 31]. Elsinger [30] and Gourieroux et al. [31]
also assume a senior–junior structure of interbank as-
sets. Whereas they obtain a clearing payment vector for
a given network (as in Eisenberg and Noe [32]), we study
the cascade condition for ensembles of random networks
in the same spirit as Watts [21] and followup work in
physics [18–20, 22–25, 33–35]. The former approach can
be useful to regulators faced with a real system on the
verge of a crisis, whereas the latter approach offers ele-
FIG. 1. (Color online) An example of a bank’s balance sheet.
Assets (left-hand column) consist of external assets, lS = 4
many senior interbank loans, and lJ = 3 many junior inter-
bank loans. Liabilities (right-hand column) consist of exter-
nal liabilities, bS = 2 many senior interbank liabilities, and
bJ = 3 many junior interbank liabilities. Net worth (a.k.a.
equity or, for banks, capital) is the difference between assets
and liabilities.
gant theory and indicative suggestions [29]. Although fi-
nancial networks change over time, there is evidence that
their statistical properties (such as degree distributions)
can be somewhat stable [28].
B. Model
1. Multiplex network of loans of different seniority
We consider a multiplex network consisting of N nodes
and M layers. Each node represents a financial institu-
tion (or a “bank” for simplicity). Each layer is a set
of directed edges (i.e., ordered pairs of nodes) that de-
note loans and, more generally, credit exposures between
banks. The layer to which an edge belongs is the loan’s
seniority, and the vector of layers is sorted in increasing
order of seniority. When a bank goes bankrupt, it re-
pays its liabilities in decreasing order of seniority; that
is, it repays its most senior liabilities first, its second-
most senior liabilities second, etc. For the moment, we
consider a two-layer (“duplex”) network, and the M = 2
many levels of seniority are called “junior” and “senior”
(labeled J and S), respectively.
The number of banks to which a bank lends funds of
seniority α ∈ {J, S} (i.e., the bank’s out-degree in layer
α) is denoted by lα. Likewise, the number of banks from
which a bank borrows funds of seniority α (i.e., the bank’s
in-degree in layer α) is denoted by bα. For simplicity,
we assume that the sizes of loans (i.e., the notional val-
ues) are the same, so we can consider the networks as
unweighted. Thus, the out-degree and the in-degree cor-
respond to the bank’s total volume of lending and bor-
rowing, respectively.
Banks may also hold assets and issue liabilities outside
the banking system. (For instance, external creditors
may lend to banks in the form of demand deposits.) The
balance sheet of a typical bank is illustrated in Fig. 1.
32. Multiple types of default
In a model with two levels of seniority of debt, there
are two types of defaults (bankruptcies): junior-defaults
and senior-defaults. A bank is in junior-default if and
only if its capital (a.k.a. equity or net worth; see Fig. 1)
is negative, meaning that it cannot pay all of its junior
debts. A bank is in senior-default if and only if its capital
is so far below zero that it cannot pay its all of its senior
debts nor any of its junior debts. Note that banks in
senior-default are necessarily in junior-default as well.
We assume that when a bank goes into junior-default,
it cannot repay any of its junior-level liabilities, and when
a bank goes into senior-default, it cannot pay any of its
junior liabilities nor any of its senior liabilities. Said dif-
ferently, we assume that loss given default of seniority
α is 100% for interbank liabilities of seniority of α and
lower. This assumption departs from previous cascade
models of financial contagion, such as that of Gai and
Kapadia [1], in which loss given default is 100% for all
interbank liabilities, no matter their seniority. Table I
makes this assumption concrete: the value of a bank’s
debt is equal to some positive value (say, 1 unit of cur-
rency) if the bank is solvent (i.e., if its equity is nonneg-
ative); the value of the bank’s junior debt falls to zero
when the bank becomes insolvent, and the value of its
senior debt falls to zero when the bank’s equity passes a
nonpositive threshold value (derived later to be −bJ).
TABLE I. Relationship between the equity of a borrower and
the value of its junior debts and senior debts held by its credi-
tors. Here, we assume that junior and senior debts are equally
valuable when the borrower is solvent, so values of debts are
either zero or $1. If the borrower’s equity is negative but suf-
ficiently large (≥ −bJ), then it can pay its senior debts but
none of its junior debts; the borrower is in “junior-default”.
For sufficiently negative equity of the borrower, the borrower
cannot pay neither its junior debts nor its senior debts; the
borrower is in “senior-default”, and all its debts have value
zero.
equity status junior debt value senior debt value
≥ 0 solvent $1 $1
< 0 junior-default 0 $1
< −bJ senior-default 0 0
3. Thresholds for junior- and senior-default
Initially, all banks are solvent, and a small fraction
of banks are chosen to be in junior-default or in senior-
default. These initial defaults could be caused by the
loss of external assets. These bank failures cause losses
for their creditors, who may default as a result, which
may cause one or more of their creditors to default, and
so on, resulting in a cascade of default.
Consider some point in time during a cascade. For a
certain bank, let mJ denote the number of its junior-
borrowers that have junior-defaulted, and let mS de-
note the number of its senior-borrowers that have senior-
defaulted. This bank is in junior-default if and only if
its losses mJ +mS exceeds the bank’s equity w, and this
bank is in senior-default if and only if its losses mJ +mS
exceed the sum of its equity w and its junior liabilities
bJ .
To exploit the solution technique for threshold cas-
cades in networks [18–20, 22, 23], we express these in-
equalities in terms of losses relative to total out-degree
lJ + lS : the bank is in default at layer α ∈ {J, S} if and
only if
mJ +mS
lJ + lS
> Rα ≡
{
w
lJ+lS
if α = J
w+bJ
lJ+lS
if α = S
(1)
[In Appendix A, we generalize the thresholds Rα in
Eq. (1) to the general case of M ≥ 1 layers.] Figure 2
illustrates a bank in junior-default and a bank in senior-
default in two ways: as losses on a balance sheet (top
row) and as contagion in a multiplex network (bottom
row).
The dynamics of multilevel default contagion can
be described as a multiplex version of the threshold
model [21, 24, 33, 36]. (Other multiplex generalizations
were studied in [18–20].) The “response functions” for
each layer are
FJ(~l,~b, ~m) ≡
{
1 if mJ+mSlJ+lS > RJ
0 otherwise
(2a)
FS(~l,~b, ~m) ≡
{
1 if mJ+mS−bJlJ+lS > RJ
0 otherwise
, (2b)
where ~l ≡ (lJ , lS),~b ≡ (bJ , bS) and ~m ≡ (mJ ,mS). If
the outputs of FJ and FS are both 0, then the bank is
solvent; if FJ gives 1, then the bank is in junior-default;
if FS gives 1, then the bank is in senior-default (and in
junior-default).
We note in passing that a special case of this model
coincides with a special case of the “multistage complex
contagion” model of Melnik et al. [25]; for details, see
Appendix B.
II. MULTILEVEL CASCADES ON 2-LAYER
MULTIPLEX NETWORKS OF JUNIOR AND
SENIOR LOANS
This multiplex model adds a new dimension of com-
plexity to previous threshold models [1–3, 21, 22, 24] by
considering multiple levels of seniority of debt, so to un-
derstand the model we start by simplifying in two other
dimensions, the distribution of networks and the distri-
bution of thresholds.
4FIG. 2. (Color online) An example of the balance sheet (and the corresponding multiplex network visualizations) of a bank
that is (a) in junior-default: mJ +mS > RJ(lJ + lS) ≡ w and (b) in senior-default: mJ +mS > RS(lJ + lS) ≡ w+ bJ . Circular
and spiky-shaped nodes are solvent and insolvent (a.k.a. bankrupt, in default), respectively, in that layer. Edges point from
lender to borrower. Senior loans are dashed green arrows; junior loans are solid red arrows. In panel (a), the bank labeled A
suffers losses of mJ + mS = 2 on its assets side (assets are listed on the left-hand side of the bank’s balance sheet) because
mJ = 1 of its (lJ = 3 many) junior debtors are in junior-default and because mS = 1 of its (lS = 4 many) senior debtors are in
senior-default. These losses exceed bank A’s equity (w), so bank A cannot pay off all its (bJ many) junior liabilities. Because of
the assumption that loss given default at layer α is 100% for all creditors in that layer, all of A’s junior creditors do not receive
repayments on their loan to A, and we say that A goes into junior-default. However, bank A does not go into senior-default
because it can still pay its senior liabilities (i.e., because mJ + mS ≤ w + bJ). In panel (b), bank A suffers so many losses
(mJ +mS = 5) that it cannot repay its junior creditors nor its senior creditors, so bank A goes into senior-default.
First, each layer is modeled as an independent, lo-
cally treelike, random directed network generated by the
configuration model. The sparsity and independence
of the layers implies that the number of “overlapping
edges” (i.e., junior and senior loans between the same
pair of banks) is negligibly small for sufficiently large net-
works [37].
Second, following previous studies [1–3], we assume
that every bank has the same junior-default threshold
RJ = w/(lJ + lS). This assumption implies that all
banks have the same ratio of capital to total interbank
assets. In the real world, banks’ capital-to-asset ra-
tios are not identical, of course, but they are somewhat
similar [38]. It is straightforward to consider hetero-
geneous capital-to-asset ratios by considering heteroge-
neous thresholds [3, 22].
A. Analytical approximation
Let φJ0 and φ
S
0 denote the probabilities that a node is
initially in junior-default or in senior-default, where 0 <
φJ0  1 and φS0 ∈ [0, φJ0 ]. Next we adapt to this model a
technique for calculating whether cascades likely spread
widely, the cascade condition, introduced in [21, 22] and
generalized to other multiplex network models in [18–20].
1. Recursion equations
Consider a bank chosen uniformly at random, and let
the network hang down like a tree from this root node
by doing a breadth-first search along the directions of the
edges. We define φαt+1 as the probability that a node t+1
hops from the bottom of the tree is in α-default because
sufficiently many of its debtors (i.e., its out-neighbors)
are in default. The nodes at the bottom of the tree are
initially in α-default with probability φα0 . To compute
φαt+1 from φ
α
t , we condition on whether a node located t+
1 hops above the leaves of the tree is initially in α-default,
which occurs independently with probability φα0 . If this
node is not initially in α-default, then we condition on
the number of debtors of this node that have defaulted.
For a sufficiently large graph, the fractions of nodes
in junior- and senior-default at the end of the cascade
are well approximated by a fixed point (φJ∞, φ
S
∞) of the
recursion equations
φαt+1 = g
(α)(φJt , φ
S
t )
≡ φα0 + (1− φα0 )
∑
lJ+lS≥1
∑
bJ
pJ,loanlJ p
S,loan
lS
pJ,borrowbJ
×
lJ∑
mJ=0
lS∑
mS=0
BlJmJ (φ
J
t )B
lS
mS (φ
S
t )Fα(
~l,~b, ~m), (3)
5for α ∈ {J, S}, where pα,borrowbα and p
α,loan
lα
denote the
in- and out-degree distributions, respectively, on layer
α ∈ {J, S}. In Eq. (3), we approximated the numbers
of neighbors in junior and senior default as independent
binomial random variables, the probability mass func-
tions of which are written using the shorthand notation
Blm(φ) ≡
(
l
m
)
φm(1 − φ)l−m]. This approximation works
well when the network layers are independent and hence
the number of overlapping edges is negligibly small [37].
(If overlap is significant, then one could adapt the tech-
niques introduced in a study of mutual percolation [16]
to this threshold model.) Variants of Eq. 3 appear in
several studies of this threshold model; see, for exam-
ple, [22, Eqs. (1)–(3)], [23, Eqs. (1) and (4)], [18, Eqs.
(1)–(3)], [19, Eqs. (11)–(13)], [25, Eqs. (A9)–(A11)], [20,
Eqs. (1)–(3)] and, for a rigorous treatment, [7, Theorem
1]; the closest variant is the study of directed (but not
multiplex) networks [24, Eqs. (14) and (15)].
In short, we approximate the multiplex graph as a tree
according to outgoing edges, and φαt+1 is the probability
that a bank (located t+1 hops from the leaves of the tree)
goes into α-default because it was initially in α-default or
because of the defaults of its debtors. Note from Eq. (2)
that going into senior-default due to defaulted debtors
implies having gone into junior-default due to defaulted
debtors [i.e., FS(~l,~b, ~m) = 1 implies FJ(~l,~b, ~m) = 1], so
the fraction in senior-default never exceeds the fraction
in junior-default [i.e., φSt ≤ φJt for all t ≥ 0].
For convenience, we rewrite the recursions (3) as(
φJt+1
φSt+1
)
=
(
g(J)(φJt , φ
S
t )
g(S)(φJt , φ
S
t )
)
. (4)
Iterating Eq. (4) to a fixed point (φJ∞, φ
S
∞) gives the ex-
pected fractions of banks in junior-default and senior-
default, respectively, at the end of the cascade.
2. Multiplex cascade condition
Now we obtain a simple expression that approximately
captures, in the limit of network size approaching infinity,
for which parameters a vanishingly small seed triggers a
cascade that results in a finite fraction of banks in junior-
or senior-default. The first-order cascade condition is the
linear instability of Eq. (4) at the origin (0, 0), which
provides a sufficient condition for the numbers of junior-
and senior-defaulted banks to grow. The Jacobian matrix
of the right-hand side of Eq. (4) is denoted by
J ≡
(JJJ JJS
JSJ JSS
)
. (5)
The first-order cascade condition is that the largest eigen-
value of the Jacobian matrix, λmax(J ), exceeds 1:
λmax(J ) ≡ JJJ + JSS +
√
(JJJ − JSS)2 + 4JJSJSJ
2
> 1. (6)
In Appendix C, we simplify the Jacobian matrix and
show that, for this model, its largest eigenvalue equals
its trace.
B. Cascade regions
If many banks are in junior-default, the fraction of
banks in senior-default could be large or small. Thus,
there are two other cascade conditions: one for junior-
defaults and another for senior-defaults. Next we derive
these conditions in some generality (for ensembles of mul-
tiplex networks with independent layers that are speci-
fied by their degree distributions). We also illustrate all
three cascade conditions (junior, senior, and multiplex)
for a particular case of interest: a multiplex network of
two uncorrelated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks of mean degree
〈lJ〉 and 〈lS〉, respectively.
1. Cascades of junior-default (ignoring senior-default)
First consider contagion only on junior loans. The
“junior-only” cascade condition is that a junior-default
causes on average at least one more junior-default, or
equivalently that the top-left entry of the Jacobian ma-
trix, JJJ , exceeds 1. In Appendix C, we show that this
junior-only cascade condition is the inequality
JJJ = E[lJ(11>RJ (lJ+lS))] > 1. (7)
The set of parameters satisfying this junior-only cas-
cade condition (7) is shown in orange in Fig. 3(a) for
uncorrelated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks of mean degree 〈lJ〉
and 〈lS〉. If the senior-layer is the empty graph (i.e., if
〈lS〉 = 0), then we recover standard cascade models on a
single-layer network [1–3, 21, 22, 24]. Creating more se-
nior loans (i.e., increasing 〈lS〉) shrinks the “junior-only”
cascade region. This shrinking occurs because a bank’s
equity w = RJ(lJ+lS) increases with its number of senior
loans lS [recall Eq. (1)]. Thus, as the expected number
〈lS〉 of senior loans per bank increases, a typical bank’s
buffer against junior-default (w) increases, which makes
a junior-default less likely to cause other junior-defaults.
2. Cascades of senior-default (ignoring junior-default)
In a similar way, consider contagion along senior loans
only. The “senior-only” cascade condition is that a
senior-default causes on average at least one more senior-
default, or equivalently that the bottom-right entry of
the Jacobian matrix, JSS , exceeds 1. In Appendix C, we
show that this senior-only cascade condition is
JSS = E[lS(11−bJ>RJ (lJ+lS))]
= pJ,borrow0 E[lS11>RJ (lJ+lS)] > 1. (8)
6The first-order cascade condition considers defaults trig-
gered by the default of just one out-neighbor (i.e., de-
faults due to mJ + mS = 1); thus, it captures senior-
defaults of banks that lack junior debts (bJ = 0), which
explains the factor pJ,borrow0 in Eq. (8). We found that
capturing defaults caused by two bankrupt creditors (us-
ing the second-order cascade condition) was not neces-
sary to approximate simulations well, as shown in Ap-
pendix D and in Fig. 6.
The parameters satisfying this senior-only cascade con-
dition (8) are shown in green in Fig. 3(a) for uncorrelated
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks of mean degree 〈lJ〉 and 〈lS〉. This
region shrinks with the density of junior loans 〈lJ〉 for the
same reason that the junior-only cascade region shrinks
with 〈lS〉.
3. Multiplex cascades
The blue region in Fig. 3(a) is the multiplex cascade re-
gion, the set of average out-degrees (〈lJ〉, 〈lS〉) such that
the first-order cascade condition [inequality (6)] is satis-
fied. Note that, as pointed out in [18, page 3], we have
λmax(J ) ≥ max{JJJ ,JSS}. Thus, a sufficient condition
for the multiplex cascade condition to hold is that at least
one kind of default α ∈ {J, S} is supercritical (meaning
that Jαα > 1) even in the absence of the other kind of
default. Thus, the blue region in Fig. 3(a) contains both
the orange and green regions.
Importantly, however, the blue region contains pairs of
intermediate edge densities (〈lJ〉, 〈lS〉) outside the junior-
only and senior-only cascade regions. In this part of pa-
rameter space, neither junior-defaults nor senior-defaults
alone suffice to cause global cascades (i.e., JJJ < 1 and
JSS < 1), but a large cascade of defaults can neverthe-
less occur. These cascades, akin to the “multiplexity-
facilitated cascades” in [18, 20], result from the interac-
tion of junior- and senior-defaults.
C. Optimal seniority ratio
Note that the multiplex cascade region, show in blue
in Fig. 3(a), is not symmetric with respect to the average
out-degrees in the two layers, 〈lJ〉 and 〈lS〉. This asym-
metry of the cascade region results from the asymmetric
role that junior and senior loans play in the response
function [Eq. (1)]. Given this asymmetry, what ratio of
junior and senior loans is optimal in some sense?
Suppose that the average total degree 〈lJ〉 + 〈lS〉 is
kept constant and that we tune the fraction of loans
that are junior. For some loan densities 〈lJ〉 + 〈lS〉,
the multiplex cascade condition (6) holds no matter the
fraction of junior loans. For example, the line segment
{(〈lJ〉, 〈lS〉) : 4 = 〈lJ〉 + 〈lS〉} is contained within the
multiplex cascade region in Fig. 3(a), so defaults spread
widely no matter the composition of seniority levels. In
other cases, such as the line segment of mean degrees
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FIG. 3. (Color online) (a) The multiplex cascade region
[the edge-density parameters (〈lJ〉, 〈lS〉) satisfying Eq. (6),
drawn as a blue region with a thick, solid boundary] con-
tains the junior-only and senior-only cascade conditions given
by Eqs. (7) and (8) and drawn as an orange region (with a
dashed boundary) and green region (with a dotted boundary),
respectively. Moreover, the multiplex cascade region is asym-
metric in the densities of junior and senior loans, (〈lJ〉, 〈lS〉).
The optimal seniority ratio, defined in Eq. (9), is drawn as a
black line. This ratio 〈lS〉/〈lJ〉 ≈ 1.79 minimizes the cascade
window, the set of mean degrees satisfying the first-order cas-
cade condition, Eq. (6). The case of equally many junior and
senior loans (on average) is shown with a dashed line, which
has a slightly larger cascade window. (b) The cascade win-
dow as a function of the ratio of senior loans to junior loans,
〈lS〉/〈lJ〉, achieves a minimum size at ≈ 1.79.
satisfying 7 = 〈lJ〉+ 〈lS〉 in Fig. 3(a), the cascade condi-
tion (6) holds if and only if the fraction of junior loans
is very small or somewhat large. In cases like this one,
having an intermediate fraction of junior debts prevents
defaults from spreading widely.
Now suppose that we can set the ratio 〈lS〉/〈lJ〉 of
the average numbers of senior and junior loans per bank,
7but the total density of loans 〈lS〉 + 〈lS〉 can vary. For
instance, the number of loans may increase during an
economic boom and decrease during a recession, yet the
fraction of loans that are senior does not change. Thus,
we are considering rays through the origin in Fig. 3(a).
For “seniority ratios” σ ≥ 0, define the cascade win-
dow to be the set of average degrees (〈lS〉, 〈lJ〉) such that
〈lS〉/〈lJ〉 = σ and such that the first-order cascade condi-
tion (6) holds. Figure 3(b) shows this cascade window as
a function of the seniority ratio 〈lS〉/〈lJ〉. Note that the
size of the cascade window is minimized at a unique value
of 〈lS〉/〈lJ〉, which is approximately 1.79 in Fig. 3. We
define the optimal seniority ratio to be this minimizer,
or more precisely,
〈lS〉
〈lJ〉 optimal := arg minσ≥0 |{r ≥ 0 : λmax(J ) ≥ 1}| (9a)
where r is the distance from the origin, | · | denotes
Lebesgue measure on R, and λmax(J ) is evaluated at
〈lJ〉 = r√
1 + σ2
, 〈lS〉 = rσ√
1 + σ2
, (9b)
where we have changed from polar to Cartesian coor-
dinates via (r, arctanσ) 7→ (〈lJ〉, 〈lS〉). If this optimal
seniority ratio (〈lS〉/〈lJ〉)optimal is greater than one (as
in Fig. 3), then senior debts should be issued more than
junior debts (on average) for the sake of minimizing the
size of the set of network densities such that bankrupt-
cies spread widely. That is, if a financial network keeps
approximately the same ratio of senior to junior loans
(〈lS〉/〈lJ〉) but changes the total number of loans (say,
over the course of a business cycle), then there should be
more senior loans than junior loans in order to minimize
the risk of a large cascade of defaults.
Intuitively, senior loans are stabilizing because they are
less significant early in a cascade: a node in junior-default
causes losses (of assets) for its lenders (in-neighbors) in
the junior layer only. Thus, changing some loans from ju-
nior to senior makes large cascades less likely, and hence
it shrinks the cascade window. However, not all loans
should be senior, because that case is identical to all
loans being junior, which has a dangerously large cas-
cade window [look at the horizontal and vertical axes of
Fig. 3(a)]. In between those extremes lies an optimal ra-
tio of senior to junior loans. That optimal ratio exceeds
one [the dashed black 45-degree line in Fig. 3(a)] because
senior loans are less contagious, in the sense that nodes
in junior-default can still repay their senior debts.
In Fig. 7 of Appendix D, we show that the three
types of cascade regions shown in Fig. 3(a) (junior-only,
senior-only, and multiplex) closely agree with the fixed
point of the recursion equations (4) and with numerical
simulations of the model for uncorrelated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
multiplex networks. These comparisons also show that
within the multiplex cascade region many nodes end up
in junior-default, but many nodes are in senior-default
only when senior loans greatly outnumber junior loans.
In practice, the number of defaults of any type is of pri-
mary concern, so our definition of the optimal seniority
ratio in Eq. (9) ignores types of defaults.
D. Effect of varying the thresholds (ratio of equity
to interbank assets)
How does the cascade region (and its optimal senior-
ity ratio) change as the banks’ threshold RJ changes?
Here we keep the assumption that banks all have the
same junior-default threshold RJ , but we vary RJ . The
multiplex network is still a pair of uncorrelated Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random graphs with mean degrees 〈lJ〉 and 〈lS〉.
If banks have a smaller capital ratio RJ , then default be-
comes more likely, so the multiplex cascade region grows,
as shown in Fig. 4(a). Conversely, as RJ increases, the
cascade region shrinks, and it can even splinter into two
regions [see the purple regions for RJ = 0.25 in Fig. 4(a)].
In cases like this one with two disjoint cascade regions,
the optimal ratio defined in Eq. (9) does not exist because
the set {r ≥ 0 : λmax(J ) ≥ 1} is empty for some σ. [A
sensible definition for the optimal seniority ratio could
be the slope that maximizes the distance from the ray
through the origin (with that slope) to the two cascade
regions.]
The asymmetry between junior and senior loans also
changes with the junior-default threshold RJ . In particu-
lar, the optimal seniority ratio increases as RJ decreases,
as shown in Fig. 4(b).
In some financial crises, many banks find themselves
in financial distress, because of losses in external assets,
for instance. The model studied here approximates this
scenario as a small junior-default threshold RJ for every
bank (and a small fraction of banks initially in default).
Decreasing RJ enlarges the cascade region, as illustrated
in Fig. 4(a). However, the banks can reduce systemic
risk if they increase, on average, the fraction of debts
that are senior. Figure 4(b) shows the optimal amount
of that increase.
III. MORE THAN TWO SENIORITY LEVELS
Now we show that mixing among several seniority
levels can further reduce systemic risk (in the sense of
shrinking the cascade region).
We generalize the model to M ≥ 1 seniority levels.
Let (1, 2, . . . ,M) denote the indices of the seniority lev-
els in increasing order of seniority, and let R1 denote
the threshold for default at the most junior layer. The
response function for default at level i, derived in Ap-
pendix A, is
Fi(~l,~b, ~m) =
{
1 if
∑M
s=1ms −
∑i−1
k=1 bk > R1
∑M
s=1 ls
0 otherwise
.
(10)
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FIG. 4. (Color online) If banks hold less capital (equity) w
relative to their interbank assets lJ + lS (i.e., if the threshold
for junior-default, RJ , decreases), then (a) the cascade re-
gion (the set of parameters satisfying the first-order cascade
condition (6)] enlarges, and (b) the optimal ratio of senior to
junior loans increases. The first-order cascade condition (6)
considers defaults that occur due to one defaulted neighbor
(for details, see Appendix C). Thus, when RJ falls below the
inverse of an integer, 1/k, nodes with total degree k and with
one defaulted neighbor will junior-default, so the cascade re-
gion changes at RJ = 1/k, and hence the optimal ratio jumps
up at RJ = 1/k.
By convention, sums of the form
∑0
k=1 are zero.
A. First-order cascade condition
The cascade condition, a straightforward generaliza-
tion of the one for M = 2 layers in Sec. II A 2, is that the
Jacobian matrix JM ∈ RM×M has largest eigenvalue ex-
ceeding one. The (i, j) entry of JM is
JMij = EM
[
lj11−∑i−1k=1 bk>R1(∑Mα=1 lα)
]
(11a)
=
i−1∏
k=1
pk,borrow0 EM
[
lj11>R1(
∑M
α=1 lα)
]
(11b)
=
i−1∏
k=1
pk,borrow0
∑
~l:
∑M
α=1 lα<1/R1
M∏
s=1
ps,loanls lj . (11c)
Here, products of the form
∏0
k=1 are defined to be 1,
and the expectations EM are over p1,loanl1 , . . . , p
M,loan
lM
and
over p1,borrowb1 , . . . , p
M−1,borrow
bM−1 . The expression in (11b)
equals that in (11a) because the threshold R1 > 0, so
the indicator in (11a) is 1 only if the bank has no liabil-
ities of seniority k (i.e., bk = 0) for all k = 1, 2, . . . , i −
1; furthermore, because a bank’s in- and out-degrees
are independent, the indicator in Eq. (11a) factors
to 1bk=0 ∀ k∈{1,2,...,i−1}11>R1(
∑M
α=1 lα)
. Equation (11c)
writes out the expectation in Eq. (11b) by summing over
~l ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }M such that ∑Mα=1 lα < 1/R1.
Observe from Eq. (11b) that JM consists of rows that
are linearly dependent. Thus, JM has rank one and only
one non-zero eigenvalue. Because the trace of a matrix
equals the sum of its eigenvalues, the largest eigenvalue
of JM is its trace, which, from Eq. (11c), is given by
trJM =
M∑
i=1
i−1∏
k=1
pk,borrow0
∑
~l:
∑M
α=1 lα<1/R1
M∏
s=1
ps,loanls li. (12)
Therefore, we can analytically express λmax(JM ) by us-
ing the degree distributions and the threshold value R1
on the most junior layer. This expression immediately
gives the first-order cascade condition, trJM > 1.
B. Distinguishing more seniority levels reduces risk
of large cascades of default
If we realize that not all loans have the same se-
niority level, how does vulnerability to large cascades
change? For simplicity, we consider “splitting” an Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random graph into M independent, identically dis-
tributed layers (as in [18]). That is, we compare a single-
layer Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with mean out-degree
z to a multiplex Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with mean
out-degree z/M in each of the M layers.
The Jacobian matrix JM-ER for an M -layer directed
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with edge density 〈li〉 in each
layer i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} is, from Eq. (11),
JM-ERij =
〈li〉Γ(d1/R1e − 1,
∑M
i=1〈li〉)
Γ(d1/R1e − 1) exp
[
−
j−1∑
k=1
〈lk〉
]
,
(13)
9where the incomplete gamma function Γ (x, y) ≡∫∞
y
ux−1e−udu and the gamma function Γ(x) ≡ Γ(x, 0).
Figure 5 shows the resulting cascade region (i.e., the
parameters satisfying trJM-ER > 1) for M ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
many Erdo˝s-Re´nyi layers that each have mean out-degree
〈li〉 = z/M . Here, the parameters are the threshold R1
for default at the most junior level (horizontal axis) and
the mean total out-degree z (vertical axis).
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FIG. 5. Distinguishing more types of seniority reduces the
size of the cascade region. In other words, with more types of
seniority, the expected size of a default cascade is negligibly
small for more pairs of thresholds R1 and expected number
of loans per bank z =
∑M
i=1〈li〉. Here we consider splitting a
directed Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network into M ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} many in-
dependent, identically distributed layers, each with the same
mean degree 〈li〉 = z/M .
Notice in Fig. 5 that the cascade region shrinks with
the number M of seniority levels, meaning that the sys-
tem is less vulnerable to large cascades of default. (By
contrast, in the model in [18], the cascade region grows
with M .) For some capital-to-interbank-asset ratios R1,
the cascade region is even eliminated as M grows (e.g.,
R1 = 0.3 for M = 1).
The reason the cascade region shrinks with M is that
making a loan more senior makes it less significant early
in a cascade. For instance, if M = 1, then a defaulted
node reduces the assets of all of its lenders (in-neighbors),
whereas if M > 1, then only the in-neighbors in layer 1
lose an asset, so less contagion occurs. The decline in
importance of more senior layers is captured by the mul-
tiplicative factor
∏i−1
k=1 p
k,borrow
0 in Eq. (11c) and by the
exponential factor in Eq. (13). In short, distinguishing
more types of seniority makes more interbank debts in-
significant (early in a crisis); hence a systemic crisis is
less likely.
This result hinges on the assumption that banks’
buffers against insolvency R1 remain constant as the
number of seniority levels (M) grows. It is possible that if
there were more seniority levels, then banks would erode
their buffers against insolvency, R1, thereby pushing the
system back toward the cascade region, where bankrupt-
cies likely spread widely.
IV. HEAVY-TAILED DEGREE
DISTRIBUTIONS
Real networks of loans among banks show evidence
of somewhat heavy-tailed degree distributions [26–28].
For instance, the network of Brazilian banks in 2007–
2008 [28] has in- and out-degree distributions that have
tails approximated by a power law ∝ k−γ with exponent
γ ≈ 2.8, and the mean in- and out-degree are both ap-
proximately 8.5.
To capture such heavy-tailed degree distributions, we
use the static model of scale-free networks [39, 40], which
allows tuning the mean degree and the exponent γ of the
degree distribution [41]. Because we lack access to data
on seniority levels of loans, we first create a random graph
with a certain mean out-degree, and then we assign a
fraction of directed edges (chosen uniformly at random)
to be junior, and the remaining are senior.
Figure 6 shows that, in numerical simulations and in
the analytical approximation (6), the fraction of loans
that are junior can determine whether large cascades of
defaults tend to occur. Notice the “valley” in Fig. 6:
there is a narrow range of “optimal” values of the frac-
tion of junior loans (horizontal axis of Fig. 6) that shrinks
the set of mean-degrees such that cascade size is large.
This optimal fraction of junior loans is approximately
0.30, which translates to an optimal seniority ratio of
〈lS〉/〈lJ〉 ≈ (1 − 0.30)/0.30 ≈ 2.3, which is qualitatively
similar to the optimal seniority ratio 1.79 found for mul-
tiplex Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks in Fig. 3.
Notice in Fig. 6 that the empirical mean out-degree in
the Brazilian network (approximately 8.5) [28] intersects
the black regions (where the mean cascade size is large)
whenever the fraction of junior loans is large or small. We
emphasize that we do not know the capital levels of these
Brazilian banks, which affects the threshold for junior-
default, RJ . However, Fig. 6 suggests that seniority levels
of loans in real-world networks could potentially affect
whether default might spread widely or not.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We model seniority of debt using a multiplex network,
and we study the likelihood of bankruptcy spreading
widely using a generalized cascade condition. The model
has interesting tradeoffs. Whereas self-interested banks
would prefer to make their loans at the most senior level,
a mixture of junior and senior debts optimally reduces
systemic risk, in that it minimizes the size of the set
of network densities such that cascades are likely large.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) For heavy-tailed degree dis-
tributions like those in the Brazilian interbank lending
network [28], having ≈ 30% of loans be junior (and the rest
senior) reduces systemic risk, in that it minimizes the size
of the set of mean total out-degrees such that bankruptcy
spreads widely. The gray-scale background shows the
average fraction of banks in junior-default (top panel) and in
senior-default (bottom panel) in simulations on 2400 banks,
begun from 10 banks initially in senior-default, averaged
over 30 simulations. The green lines mark the boundary of
the cascade region [λmax(J ) = 1 with J computed from
Eq. (C4)]. The junior-default threshold of every bank is
RJ = 0.18, as in Fig. 3. Directed graphs are generated with
the static model [39, 40] with out-degree distributions having
tail behavior ∝ k−γ with γ = 2.83, which approximates the
value found in the Brazilian interbank lending network [28].
A fraction of loans (horizontal axis) chosen uniformly at
random are junior, and the rest are senior. The “optimal”
fraction of junior loans (that minimizes the height of the
green line) is ≈ 0.30. For the mean out-degree (vertical
axis) of ≈ 8.5 observed for Brazilian banks [28], the expected
cascade size is small if and only if an intermediate fraction of
loans are junior.
Such disparity between individual interests and system-
wide stability is the “regulator’s dilemma” [42]. For two
types of seniority, and for edges placed uniformly at ran-
dom (i.e., uncorrelated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks) or accord-
ing to a heavy-tailed degree distribution, we show that
the optimal multiplex networks have on the order of 50%
to 100% more senior debts than junior debts. To give
theoretical support for policy suggestions, however, will
require considering other factors that we have abstracted
away, such as interest rates for different seniority levels,
which affect the incentives of banks.
Traditionally, cascades of losses in financial networks
have been studied using the Eisenberg-Noe algorithm [32]
for computing a market-clearing payment vector (with
losses shared proportionally), which was recently ex-
tended to multiple seniority levels [31]. The Eisenberg-
Noe algorithm is economically meaningful in normal
times, but as Cont et al. [28] point out, the algorithm is
not so reasonable for modeling an extreme event such as
the default of a large bank. We instead take an approach
typical in physics of studying ensembles of financial net-
works [1, 21]. We show that cascades on networks with
different seniority may be analyzed with a variant of mul-
tiplex threshold cascade models studied in physics [18–
20].
The seniority of debt is just one dimension of multi-
plexity in financial networks. Other dimensions of debt
include the maturity of loans and whether loans are col-
lateralized [8, 9]. Furthermore, other important interac-
tions include the trade of financial assets [43] and com-
mon exposures (i.e., multiple institutions holding the
same financial assets) [9, 44].
We call our model “multilevel contagion” because a
node can become “contagious” in one layer without nec-
essarily becoming contagious on another layer (e.g., a
bank can be in junior-default but not in senior-default).
By contrast, in other models of threshold contagion in
multiplex networks [18–20] and in variants of percola-
tion on multiplex networks [13–17], when a node changes
state in one layer, it necessarily changes state in other
layers. Multilevel contagion might give insight into other
kinds of social contagion. For example, one might use it
to model the adoption of a new product if “fans” of the
product spread influence to neighbors of one type but
“super-fans” spread influence to neighbors of two types
(a multiplex version of the multistage complex contagion
model [25]). We hope our model will stimulate further
research on these many types of cascades in social, finan-
cial, and other multiplex networks.
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Appendix A: Thresholds of default for M levels of seniority
Here we consider the general case of M ≥ 1 levels of seniority of interbank debt (rather than just two, junior and
senior), and we label the levels of seniority by α ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. We choose the convention that debts of seniority α
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are more senior than debts of seniority α′ whenever α > α′.
Recall from Fig. 1 the stylized balance sheet of a bank: a bank’s assets consist of external assets e and lα many
interbank loans of seniority α ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, while its liabilities consist of external liabilities d and bα many interbank
liabilities of seniority α ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. We assume that the external liabilities d (which could include, for example,
demand deposits) are more senior than debts to other financial institutions. The equity w is the difference between
assets and liabilities,
w = e− d+
M∑
α=1
(lα − bα).
Now suppose that this bank has some interbank assets (i.e.,
∑M
α=1 lα > 0) and that it suffers losses on mα of its
lα many interbank assets (for α ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}), so that its interbank assets now have total value
∑M
α=1(lα −mα).
Then exactly one of the following events occurs:
• The bank is solvent if and only if the capital buffer w can absorb the losses, i.e., w ≥∑Mα=1mα.
• The bank is in default at layer α′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} but not in any layer ≥ α′ + 1 if and only if
w +
α′−1∑
α=1
bα <
M∑
α=1
mα ≤ w +
α′∑
α=1
bα. (A1)
• The bank is in complete default, meaning that it cannot pay off any of its interbank debts nor any of its liabilities
to external creditors, if and only if
M∑
α=1
mα > w +
M∑
α=1
bα.
Here, we focus on cascades in the interbank network; for this purpose, we do not need to distinguish between default
at the most senior level (M) from complete default because both have the same effect on the banks that had lent to
the defaulted bank.
Rearranging the strict inequality in Eq. (A1) and dividing by the total lending
∑M
α=1 lα > 0 gives the response
function in Eq. (10).
Appendix B: Relationship with “multistage complex contagion”
Our model is related to the “multistage complex contagion” model of Melnik et al. [25]. In their model, nodes
exist in one of three states: inactive, active, and hyper-active. Their hyper-active nodes are active nodes with greater
influence on their neighbors. To see the commonality between the models, consider our model with every node
having the same junior threshold RJ and with the multiplex network consisting of two identical layers (i.e., all the
multiplex edges are “fully overlapped” [16, 37]). Then every neighbor in junior-default (respectively, in senior-default)
contributes mJ + mS = 1 (respectively, mJ + mS = 2) in the numerator of the response function. Thus, this model
is equivalent to a special case of the model in [25] in which i) the “bonus influence parameter” β (which captures the
extra influence of hyper-active nodes) takes the value 1; ii) the network is a directed single-layer graph; and iii) the
thresholds for activation and hyper-activation are RJ and RJ + bJ/(lJ + lS) = RJ + bJ/(2lJ), respectively. To model
real financial systems, however, edges should be only partially overlapped, a phenomenon studied in the contexts of
statistical mechanics in [37] and of percolation in [16]. Our multilevel contagion model could be generalized to such
a partially overlapped case by adapting techniques from the study of mutual percolation on multiplex networks with
arbitrary amounts of overlap [16], a nontrivial task left for future work.
Appendix C: Derivation of the first-order cascade condition
Now we obtain a simple expression that approximately captures for which parameters a vanishingly small seed leads
to a cascade that results in a finite fraction of banks in junior- or senior-default. Note that if the threshold RJ > 0,
then (0, 0) is a fixed point of the recursion (4) [because Bkm(0) ≡ 1m=0 and Fα(~l,~b,~0) ≡ 0 provided that RJ > 0]. The
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first-order cascade condition is the linear instability of Eq. (4) at this fixed point at the origin (φJt , φ
S
t ) = (0, 0) in the
double limit φJ0 → 0 and φS0 → 0. This linear instability provides a sufficient condition for the numbers of junior- and
senior-defaulted banks to grow (at least initially). The Jacobian matrix of the right-hand side of Eq. (4) is
J =
(JJJ JJS
JSJ JSS
)
(C1)
=
(
E[lJ(11>RJ (lJ+lS) − 10>RJ )] E[lS(11>RJ (lJ+lS) − 10>RJ )]
E[lJ(11−bJ>RJ (lJ+lS) − 1−bJ>RJ (lJ+lS))] E[lS(11−bJ>RJ (lJ+lS) − 1−bJ>RJ (lJ+lS))]
)
(C2)
(The expectations E are over the degree distributions pJ,loanlJ , p
S,loan
lS
, pJ,borrowbJ .) Assume that RJ > 0, so that the
factors 10>RJ in the top row of (C2) vanish. Also, note that bJ ≥ 0 and that RJ > 0 and lJ + lS ≥ 0, so the
factors 1−bJ>RJ (lJ+lS) in the bottom row of Eq. (C2) vanish. Finally, the other indicator in the bottom row of
Eq. (C2), namely 11−bJ>RJ (lJ+lS), simplifies to 1bJ=011>RJ (lJ+lS) because bJ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }. Because each node’s
in- and out-degrees (lJ , bJ , lS , bS) are all independent, we can factor the expectation E
[
lα1bJ=011>RJ (lJ+lS)
]
=
pJ,borrow0 E
[
lα11>RJ (lJ+lS)
]
for both α ∈ {J, S} (i.e., for the bottom-left and bottom-right entries of Eq. (C2)). It
follows that
J =
(
E[lJ11>RJ (lJ+lS)] E[lS11>RJ (lJ+lS)]
pJ,borrow0 E[lJ11>RJ (lJ+lS)] p
J,borrow
0 E[lS11>RJ (lJ+lS)]
)
(C3)
= E[lJ11>RJ (lJ+lS)]
(
1 0
pJ,borrow0 0
)
+ E[lS11>RJ (lJ+lS)]
(
0 1
0 pJ,borrow0
)
. (C4)
Note that detJ = 0. Thus, from Eq. (6), the largest eigenvalue of the Jacobian is λmax(J ) = trJ = JJJ + JSS .
It should be pointed out that this equality, λmax(J ) = trJ , does not necessarily hold true in other variants of
multiplex contagion models. For example, in multiplex models with (independent) undirected networks and/or an
exogenous senior-default threshold RS , one would generally have λmax(J ) 6= trJ . A more detailed explanation is
given in Appendix E.
Appendix D: Comparison between the first-order cascade condition with the fixed point of the recursion
equations and with numerical simulations
Figure 7 shows that the first-order cascade condition [the parameters satisfying Eq. (6), which are enclosed by the
solid blue line in Fig. 7] agrees closely with the fixed point (φJ∞, φ
S
∞) of the recursion equations (4) [Fig. 7(a) and 7(b)]
and agrees reasonably closely with the results of numerical simulations [Fig. 7(c) and 7(d)]. In the recursion equations
and simulations, we use the same initial condition, with φJ0 = φ
S
0 = 5 × 10−4. The threshold for junior-default is
RJ = 0.18, as in Fig. 3.
Notice in Fig. 7 that when a large cascade occurs, many nodes are in junior-default, but many nodes are in
senior-default if and only if, loosely speaking, there are many more senior loans than junior ones. [Look at the dark
region in the left-hand sides of Figs. 7(b) and 7(d).] In practice, we are most concerned with whether the number of
bankruptcies of any type is large. Thus, our definition of the optimal seniority ratio in Sec. II C considered only the
multiplex cascade region and not the fractions φJ∞ and φ
S
∞.
Appendix E: Multilevel cascades under alternative settings
In Appendix C, we claimed that the equality λmax(J ) = trJ , which is proved in the main text for our model, does
not necessarily hold true in other variants of the multilevel cascade model. In what follows, we substantiate this claim
by examining two variants of the 2-layer multiplex model.
1. Exogenous senior thresholds
In the model described in the main text, the threshold of senior-default, RS , depends on the threshold of junior-
default, RJ , and on the in-degree of the node on the junior layer, bJ . In this subsection, we consider an alternative
model of multilevel cascades in which the threshold of senior-default is an exogenous parameter. Let the (locally
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Here we compare the junior-only, senior-only and multiplex cascade conditions [Eqs. (6), (7), and (8),
respectively] with the fixed points of the recursion equations (4) [in panels (a) and (b)] and with numerical simulations on
random graphs with 104 nodes [in panels (c) and (d)]. The junior-default threshold of every node is RJ = 0.18 (as in Fig. 3).
The axes are the edge densities 〈lJ〉 and 〈lS〉 (i.e, the average numbers of junior and senior loans per bank). The solid blue,
dashed orange, and dot-dashed green lines surround the multiplex, junior-only, and senior-only cascade regions [i.e., the sets
of values of (〈lJ〉, 〈lS〉) that satisfy the inequalities (6), (7), and (8), respectively]. In panels (a) and (b), the grayscale in the
background shows the fixed points φJ∞ and φ
S
∞ of the recursion (4), begun from the initial condition φ
J
0 = φ
S
0 = 5× 10−4. In
panels (c) and (d), the grayscale in the background shows the fraction of nodes in junior- and senior-default, respectively, in
numerical simulations with 104 nodes and 5 banks initially in senior-default, averaged over 75 simulations. In the upper-left
part of all four panels, where most loans are senior, the fractions of nodes (φJ∞, φ
S
∞) in junior- and senior-default at the end
of the cascade are both ≈ 1. By contrast, in the lower-right part, where most loans are junior, the fraction φJ∞ of nodes in
junior-default is large [φJ∞ ≈ 1; panels (a) and (c)], whereas the fraction φS∞ of nodes in senior-default is ≈ 0.4 [see the light-gray
region surrounded by the dashed orange line in panels (b) and (d)].
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treelike) graph hang down like a tree from a root node chosen uniformly at random. The recursion equation for the
probability of default of a node t hops above the leaves of the tree is
φˆαt+1 = gˆ
(α)(φˆJt , φˆ
S
t ) ≡ φˆα0 + (1− φˆα0 )
∑
lJ+lS≥1
pJ,outlJ p
S,out
lS
lJ∑
mJ=0
lS∑
mS=0
BlJmJ (φˆ
J
t )B
lS
mS (φˆ
S
t )Fˆα(
~l, ~m) (E1)
for α ∈ {J, S}, where pJ,outlJ and p
S,out
lS
denote the out-degree distributions on the junior and senior layers, respectively.
The response functions are now Fˆα(~l, ~m) = 1mJ+mS>Rα(lJ+lS) for α ∈ {J, S}, where 0 < RJ ≤ RS ≤ 1.
The first-order cascade condition is thus given by λmax(Jˆ ) > 1, where the entries of Jˆ are E[lj11>Ri(lJ+lS)] for
(i, j) ∈ {J, S}2. Notice that the equality det Jˆ = 0 does not necessarily hold if RJ < RS . It follows that λmax(Jˆ ) is
not in general equal to trJˆ .
2. Undirected edges
Next, consider a multilevel cascade model in which edges are undirected. Again, let the graph hang down like a
tree from a root node chosen uniformly at random. Consider a node located t hops above the leaves of the tree.
The probability that this node is in α-default due to its children, conditioned on its parent in layer α ∈ {J, S} being
solvent at layer α, is given by the recursion equations
θ¯Jt+1 = θ¯
J
0 + (1− θ¯J0 )
∑
lJ+lS≥1
pJlJ lJ
〈lJ〉 p
S
lS
lJ∑
mJ=0
lS∑
mS=0
BlJmJ (θ¯
J
t )B
lS
mS (θ¯
S
t )F¯J(
~l, ~m), (E2a)
θ¯St+1 = θ¯
S
0 + (1− θ¯S0 )
∑
lJ+lS≥1
pJlJ
pSlS lS
〈lS〉
lJ∑
mJ=0
lS∑
mS=0
BlJmJ (θ¯
J
t )B
lS
mS (θ¯
S
t )F¯S(
~l, ~m), (E2b)
where one uses Eq. (E2a) [respectively, Eq. (E2b)] if the node’s parent is a neighbor in layer J (respectively, layer S),
and pαlα is the degree distribution on layer α. Because the graph is unweighted, and because this node lies at the end
of an α-type edge chosen uniformly at random, its degree in layer α is the excess degree distribution, pαlα lα/〈lα〉. The
response functions are
F¯J(~l, ~m) =
{
1 if mJ+mSlJ+lS > RJ
0 otherwise
, (E3a)
F¯S(~l, ~m) =
{
1 if mJ+mS−lJlJ+lS > RJ
0 otherwise
. (E3b)
Because the graphs are undirected, the term −bJ in FS in the original model [Eq. (2b)] is now −lJ in Eq. (E3b).
The corresponding Jacobian matrix is
J¯ =
(
EJ [(lJ − 1)11>RJ (lJ+lS)] EJ [lS11>RJ (lJ+lS)]
pJ0 ES [lJ11>RJ (lJ+lS)] pJ0 ES [(lS − 1)11>RJ (lJ+lS)]
)
, (E4)
where the expectations EJ and ES are over the joint probability distributions
pJlJ
lJ
〈lJ 〉 p
S
lS
and pJlJ
pSlS
lS
〈lS〉 , respectively. It
follows that det J¯ is generally nonzero, and therefore λmax(J¯ ) = trJ¯ does not necessarily hold.
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